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RULE 24 NOTWITHSTANDING: WHY ARTICLE
III SHOULD NOT LIMIT INTERVENTION OF
RIGHT
ZACHARY N. FERGUSON†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court recently decided in Town of Chester v. Laroe
Estates, Inc. that intervenors of right under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2) must demonstrate independent Article III standing
when they pursue relief different from that requested by an original
plaintiff. This decision resolved, in part, a decades-long controversy
among the Courts of Appeals over the proper relationship between
Rule 24 intervention and Article III standing that the Court first
acknowledged in Diamond v. Charles. But the Court’s narrow decision
in Town of Chester hardly disposed of the controversy, and Courts of
Appeals are still free to require standing of defendant-intervenors and,
it stands to reason, plaintiff-intervenors even if they do not pursue
different relief.
With this debate yet unresolved, this Note takes a less conventional
approach. In addition to arguing that the Supreme Court’s precedents
implicitly resolved this question before Town of Chester, this Note
argues that the nature of judicial decisions raises two concerns that a
liberal application of Rule 24(a)(2) would mitigate. First, this Note
argues that stare decisis limits the right of litigants to be heard on the
merits of their claims and defenses in a way that undermines the
principles of due process. Second, this Note argues that the process of
judicial decisionmaking is fraught with potential epistemic problems
that can produce suboptimal legal rules. After considering these two
concerns, this Note argues that Rule 24(a)(2) is a better and more
practical way to mitigate these problems than are Rule 24(a)(2)’s
alternatives.

INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a challenge to Indiana’s voter identification law came
before the Seventh Circuit in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Copyright © 2017 Zachary N. Ferguson.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2018.
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Board.1 Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner defended the
identification laws as imposing merely “ordinary and widespread
burdens”2 and accepted the trial judge’s finding that the data on voter
suppression presented by the plaintiff-appellants were “totally
unreliable.”3 Because no plaintiff had joined the suit alleging that they
“intend[ed] not to vote because of the new law,” Judge Posner
reasoned that “the motivation for the suit is simply that the law may
require the Democratic Party and other organizational plaintiffs to
work harder to get every last one of their supporters to the polls.”4 The
plaintiffs, Judge Posner reckoned, were engaged in a politically
motivated assault on a reasonable electoral regulation. On appeal to
the Supreme Court,5 the plaintiffs-turned-petitioners lost in a 6–3
decision. The Court, like Judge Posner, found “[t]he universally
applicable requirements of Indiana’s voter-identification law [to be]
eminently reasonable.”6
Seven years later, a similar voter identification law came before
the Seventh Circuit.7 Writing for the majority, Judge Frank
Easterbrook—Judge Posner’s intellectual frenemy—concluded that
the regulation was “amply justified by the valid interest in protecting
the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.”8 But then the
unexpected happened: a judge on the Seventh Circuit requested a vote
for a rehearing en banc, which failed by an equally divided vote.9
Unlike many rehearing orders, this one drew a fire-and-brimstone
dissent from five of the acting judges. The dissenting judges excoriated
the majority for its reliance on “downright goofy”10 evidence of voter
fraud, noting that “[e]ven Fox News, whose passion for conservative
causes has never been questioned, acknowledges that ‘Voter ID Laws
Target Rarely Occurring Voter Fraud.’”11 “[I]f there is no actual
1. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181
(2008).
2. Id. at 954.
3. Id. at 952.
4. Id.
5. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
6. Id. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
8. Id. at 755 (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204).
9. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (5–5 vote).
10. Id. at 791 (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc).
11. Id. (citing Voter ID Laws Target Rarely Occurring Voter Fraud, FOX NEWS: POLITICS
(Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/24/voter-id-laws-target-rarelyoccurring-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/7SAQ-CEW3]).
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danger of [voter identification] fraud,” the dissent argued, “[t]here is
only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting . . . and that is to
discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party
responsible for imposing the burdens.”12 Crawford’s presumptively
neutral voter identification laws were now, according to the dissent,
presumptively political.
The dissent was shocking for a number of reasons, not the least of
which was its comparison of the Wisconsin law to a literal witch hunt.13
Perhaps most shocking was the identity of the dissent’s author, Judge
Richard Posner, who had teed up the Supreme Court’s affirmation of
a similar voter identification law only seven years earlier in Crawford.
Facing critics’ charges that he had recanted his position on voter
identification laws, Judge Posner later explained his reversal on
empirical, as opposed to legal or normative, grounds: he simply did not
have enough information in Crawford to sniff out the Indiana statute’s
political motivation.14 “[I]n common with many other judges,” Judge
Posner explained, “I could not be confident that [my opinion] was
right, since I am one of the judges who doesn’t understand the electoral
process sufficiently well to be able to gauge the consequences of
decisions dealing with that process.”15
Federal judges often confront cases asking them to set precedent
with less-than-complete information.16 Because of the function of stare
decisis in the federal judiciary, these judgments often have far-reaching
and functionally permanent consequences; Crawford, for instance, is
unlikely to be overturned in the near future and, given its affirmation
by the Supreme Court, the opinion binds parties not even remotely
connected to the original litigation. At the trial level, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide a partial remedy. Rule 24(a)(2) offers a
party the right to intervene in ongoing litigation provided that the party
meet three conditions: (1) the applicant has an interest implicated by
the suit that (2) will be impaired unless the existing party adequately

12. Id. at 796.
13. Id. at 795 (“As there is no evidence that voter impersonation fraud is a problem, how can
the fact that a legislature says it’s a problem turn it into one? If the Wisconsin legislature says
witches are a problem, shall Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?”).
14. Richard A. Posner, I Did Not ‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-not-recant-my-opinion-voter-id
[https://perma.cc/QW7X-CNKS].
15. Id.
16. For a discussion of the epistemic constraints of judicial decisionmaking, see infra Part
II.B.2 .
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represents it, and (3) the existing party is inadequately representing the
interest.17 Thus, a party who might be affected by a given case—even if
the effect is somewhat speculative18—has the right under Rule 24(a)(2)
to make arguments the original party either refused or was
incompetent to make, or to present additional evidence (of voter fraud,
for example).19
Although the text of Rule 24(a)(2) lays out only three
requirements, several circuits have engrafted Article III’s standing
requirements onto the Rule,20 creating an additional hurdle to thirdparty intervention. As a result, federal courts in these circuits are
denied potentially relevant information from parties not immediately
bound by a given case. Those same parties are denied the ability to
represent their interests in precedent-setting litigation, and because
lower federal courts adhere rigidly to stare decisis, these parties are
effectively prevented from challenging precedents once set.
Academic commentary on the Rule 24(a)(2) circuit split has
focused on whether Article III requires would-be intervenors to
establish standing.21 After declining on several occasions to address this
issue,22 the Supreme Court recently revisited this question in Town of

17. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
18. For cases that recognize adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable interest under Rule
24(a)(2), see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
19. For example, the defendant-intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger—a pro-affirmative action
nonprofit and seventeen minority students seeking admission to the University of Michigan—
argued that they would advance certain defenses of affirmative action that the University, subject
to “internal and external institutional pressures,” could not. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394,
400 (6th Cir. 1999). The defendant-intervenors also argued that, because an adverse ruling would
harm the University less than it would them, the University alone would “not defend the case as
vigorously as [would] the proposed intervenors.” Id.
20. For cases in which courts of appeals have held that intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2) need
to show Article III standing, see infra note 79.
21. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 463 (1991) (suggesting
a “pragmatic, equitable recalibration” of the approach to standing and Rule 24); Amy M.
Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirements for Rule
24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 684 (2002) (arguing that intervention should be allowed so
long as “the original parties remain in the suit and meet the requirements for standing”); Juliet
Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking in: Must Intervenors Demonstrate Standing To
Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 480 (2002) (arguing that requiring Article III standing of an
intervenor should depend on the type of relief sought); Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(a)
Intervention of Right: Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 527, 530 (2002) (arguing in favor of applying standing requirements to intervenors).
22. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1986) (“We need not decide today
whether a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements
of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”).
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Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.23 In a unanimous opinion, the Court
narrowly held that intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2) must establish
independent standing when the intervenor pursues relief not requested
by a plaintiff.24 As several commentators have noted,25 the result in
Town of Chester leaves open the question of whether an intervenor
who seeks the same relief as a plaintiff needs to show independent
Article III standing. The opinion also leaves unanswered the question
of whether intervenors who seek no relief at all—including defendantintervenors, in most cases—need to satisfy Article III standing. With
these questions still open,26 this Note argues that the quasi-legislative
character of judicial decisions and decisionmaking militates against
imposing Article III standing on Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors when the
intervenors do not request different relief.
Specifically, this Note argues that when judicial decisionmaking
creates a quasi-legislative rule, as is the case with most opinions, courts’
use of Article III standing to exclude would-be intervenors from this
process raises two interrelated concerns. First, excluding additional
parties decreases the volume and, potentially, the quality of
information entering the process, thereby increasing the probability
that the court will generate bad precedent. This is especially true when
the original party’s representation of a given interest is inadequate, a
possibility the text of Rule 24(a)(2) openly acknowledges.27 Second, a
court’s ruling effectively binds all future litigants within its jurisdiction.
To varying extents, future litigants are thus denied the opportunity to
be heard on the merits of their claims and defenses. Although this

23. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017)
24. Id. at 1648.
25. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Opinion Analysis: Standing, Intervention, and a Narrow
Disposition, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2017, 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinionanalysis-standing-intervention-narrow-disposition [https://perma.cc/H2WQ-4CJZ] (“The court’s
narrow decision did not expressly address . . . [whether] an intervenor need[s to] show standing if
its litigation activities do not extend beyond asserting the same claim for the same remedies as
the original plaintiff.”).
26. The Court’s opinion left open the possibility that standing could be required of
intervenors seeking the same relief. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1647 (“Thus, at the least, an
intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond
that which the plaintiff requests.” (emphasis added)).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (entitling an interested party to intervene if their interest will
be impaired “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)
advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“The general purpose of original Rule
24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee, purportedly represented by a party, to intervene in the action
if he could establish with fair probability that the representation was inadequate.”).
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denial does not violate procedural due process, it does undermine the
principles underlying the doctrine.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the circuit split,
arguing that, despite Supreme Court rulings suggesting some
resolution, the debate as to whether Article III applies or ought to
apply to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention remains open. To the extent that
the Supreme Court has considered the issue, its precedents suggest that
Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors requesting the same relief need not
demonstrate independent Article III standing. Part II considers the
scope and effect of stare decisis, arguing that the doctrine—if not for
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention—denies the federal judiciary potentially
important information and denies would-be intervenors the ability to
fully defend their interests. For instance, the Seventh Circuit is among
the minority of circuits requiring independent Article III standing of
Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors.28 Were it otherwise, the court in Crawford
could have benefited from the intervention of public interest groups
specializing in election law, such as the Brennan Center for Justice,
which was relegated to filing an amicus brief.29 Finally, Part III
evaluates the alternatives to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention—namely, the
amicus brief and the political process—and ultimately argues that Rule
24 without a standing requirement best guards against the process
errors discussed in Part II.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE III STANDING, RULE 24(A)(2), AND
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the majority of this Note focuses on the information- and
equity-related arguments against engrafting Article III’s standing
requirement onto Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, this Part focuses on the
doctrine underlying Rule 24 intervention and standing, and the
purposes both are meant to serve. This Part also argues that recent
developments in standing jurisprudence cast serious doubt on some
courts’ arguments for requiring Article III standing of Rule 24(a)(2)
intervenors.

28. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011).
29. For a discussion of the Brennan Center’s brief in Crawford, see infra note 232 and
accompanying text.
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A. Rule 24(a)(2), Then and Now
Though it has some antecedents in Roman and civil law, the right
to intervene in ongoing litigation is a relatively recent development in
Anglo-American jurisprudence.30 As with compulsory joinder under
Rule 19 and class action under Rule 23, Rule 24 intervention arose in
response to the modern recognition that “a lawsuit often is not merely
a private fight and will have implications on those not named as
parties.”31 Rule 24(b), the “permissive” subdivision of Rule 24, grants
judges discretion to allow intervention by a party who has a
“conditional right to intervene by a federal statute”32 or “a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.”33 Rule 24(a)(2), by contrast, allows intervention “of right,”
removing judges’ discretion to disallow intervention so long as the
would-be intervenor meets the Rule’s conditions.34 After its last
substantive amendment in 1966, Rule 24(a)(2) reads, in relevant part:
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who
. . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
interest.35

It is worth noting that Rule 24(a)(2) emphasizes the “practical”
nature of the impediment or impairment that triggers intervention of
right. The pre-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) required that “the applicant [actually
or potentially] be bound by a judgment in the action”36 before she had
the right to intervene. Though a minority of courts interpreted
“bound” to mean practical prejudice,37 a 1961 Supreme Court ruling

30. See James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right To Intervene
and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 568–70 (1935).
31. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901, at 258 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter 7C WRIGHT & MILLER].
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(A).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
34. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 261 (noting that, unlike Rule 24(b)’s
appeal to judicial discretion, Rule 24(a)(2) “seems to pose only a question of law”).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment.
37. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“We
are of the opinion . . . [that] the res judicata test for determining whether an applicant for
intervention in the action will be bound by the judgment therein is unworkable and
inappropriate.”). This was a fairly squishy standard. The Third Circuit, for example, required only
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affirmed the majority interpretation of “bound” as analogous to res
judicata.38 The 1966 amendment intentionally broadened harm
cognizable under Rule 24(a)(2) to include not only res judicata, but
“practical” impairment as well.39 Furthermore, the 1966 amendment
redefined the “interest” required from “an interest in property” to one
also recognizing “less tangible interests.”40 The aggregate force of these
changes was to “abandon[] formalistic restrictions in favor of ‘practical
considerations’ to allow courts to reach pragmatic solutions to
intervention problems.”41 As a result, the decade following the
amendment saw a dramatic increase in public interest litigation—the
reformed Rule 24(a)(2) had become better equipped to recognize the
“relatively intangible, abstract” interests these organizations
represent.42
With greater scope came greater confusion. Whereas the more
limited remit of the pre-1966 Rule lent itself to relatively
straightforward judicial application,43 the liberalized post-1966 Rule
has proven considerably harder to apply.44 In particular, the bounds of
what can be considered a Rule 24(a)(2) “interest” are ill-defined,45 and
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this point has provided unclear
guidance.46

that an applicant’s rights would be “affected” by an adverse decision. Mack v. Passaic Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1945).
38. See Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (“We regard it as fully
settled that a person whose private interests coincide with the public interest in government
antitrust litigation is nonetheless not bound by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may
not, as of right, intervene in it.”).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“The
[amended rule] imports practical considerations, and the deletion of the ‘bound’ language
similarly frees the rule from undue preoccupation with strict considerations of res judicata.”).
40. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 252–53 n.164 (1990). But see
Tobias, supra note 21, at 429–32 (noting that the intent behind the 1966 amendment “remains
unclear and controversial”).
41. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1901, at 257–60 (noting that Rules 19, 23, and 24 are
“an effort to strike a balance between varying interests”).
42. Tobias, supra note 21, at 419.
43. Id. at 422.
44. Id. at 432.
45. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908.1, at 300 (“There is not any clear
definition of the nature of the ‘interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of action’ that is required for intervention of right.”).
46. See id. (“The Supreme Court has spoken to the question [of what constitutes an ‘interest’
under Rule 24] twice since the rule was amended in 1966, but those cases generally have been
limited to their somewhat unique facts.”).
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What is certain is that the post-1966 Rule 24(a)(2) opens the door
to parties attempting to protect interests that would not normally
constitute the “concrete” and “actual or imminent” injury Article III
standing requires. For instance, numerous circuits have recognized the
potential for adverse precedent as a cognizable interest under Rule
24(a)(2).47
B. Article III Standing
In marked contrast to Rule 24’s court-opening force, the standing
requirement of Article III determines “whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits [of his dispute].”48 Article III
standing derives from the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Clause,49
which establishes the scope of the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction. The
“irreducible minimum” of Article III standing is: (1) a distinct and
actual injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant
and that (3) will be redressed if the Court renders a favorable
decision.50
47. See, e.g., Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
potential for negative stare decisis effect ‘may supply that practical disadvantage which warrants
intervention of right.’” (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir. 1989)));
Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Utah Ass’n
of Ctys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he stare decisis effect of the district
court’s judgment is sufficient impairment for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).” (quoting Coal.
of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir.
2001))); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“[T]he stare
decisis effect of an adverse judgment constitutes a sufficient impairment to compel
intervention.”); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting
intervention “primarily to guard against encountering the stare decisis effect of a decision in favor
of the defendants”); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“We think that under
[the post-1966-amendment Rule 24(a)(2)] stare decisis principles may in some cases supply the
practical disadvantage that warrants intervention as of right.”). But see Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v.
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 550 B.R. 241, 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (suggesting that
the court in Nuesse “observed that it would not apply Rule 24 literally to atypical cases such as
the one before it”).
48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party . . . .”).
50. As the Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action
of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
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Standing has also traditionally comprised several prudential
limitations,51 though the status of prudential standing is now in
question. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc.,52 the Supreme Court reaffirmed “the principle that ‘a federal
court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is
virtually unflagging.’”53 As a result, “prudential” doctrines not
grounded in Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement—such as
the zone-of-interests test—are now presumptively unconstitutional.54
It is difficult to know whether Lexmark signifies the “end of prudential
standing,”55 as some academic commentary has suggested.56
Regardless, Lexmark can at least be seen to affirm the proposition that,
once jurisdiction is established, standing cannot be used as a prudential
bar to limit the public’s access to the federal judiciary.
Of particular concern to this Note is Lexmark’s elevation of the
ban on generalized grievances to Article III status. The prohibition on
generalized grievances—the adjudication of “abstract questions of
wide public significance”57—exists “to limit the role of the courts in
resolving public disputes.”58 Whereas Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife59
had already arguably incorporated the prohibition on generalized
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (first alteration added) (quoting Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); then quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–42, 43 (1976)) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); then citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); then citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–
741 n.16 (1972)).
51. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (“Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has
also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.”). The three
principles of prudential standing are: (1) the prohibition against asserting the rights of third
parties, (2) the prohibition of generalized grievances, and (3) the requirement that a plaintiff’s
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by a given statute or constitutional guarantee.
See id. at 474–75 (listing and explaining the three principles of prudential standing).
52. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
53. Id. at 1386 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
54. See id. at 1387 n.3 (categorizing the ban on generalized grievances as an Article III
requirement and declining to decide the “proper place” of third-party standing limitations).
55. Michael Ramsey, Lexmark v. Static Control: The End of Prudential Standing?,
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 27, 2014), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/
2014/03/lexmark-v-static-control-the-end-of-prudential-standingmichael-ramsey.html [https://per
ma.cc/BS77-69B7].
56. For a more nuanced discussion of Lexmark and prudential standing, see generally Ernest
A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149 (2014).
57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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grievances into Article III standing,60 Lexmark made clear that the
prohibition rests on “constitutional reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.”61
This represents a further tightening of standing doctrine begun by the
Rehnquist Court.62 In contrast to the Warren Court’s more lenient view
of Article III standing, which allowed plaintiffs to bring suits even if
they were not demonstrably more injured than the general public,63 the
modern doctrine of standing requires that a plaintiff have suffered “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and
particularized,”64 such that she is “‘directly’ affected apart from [her]
‘special interest in th[e] subject.”65 For instance, a plaintiff who seeks
under the Endangered Species Act66 to challenge a federal project will
not have standing merely on the basis of her special interest in a
particular endangered species.67 But once she forms “concrete plans”68
to see that species, such as by buying a plane ticket to the project site,69
her injury becomes concrete and particularized. Accordingly, such a
plaintiff would be well on her way to satisfying the requirements of
Article III standing.
At first glance, it is not entirely clear why Rule 24 intervention
should require a showing of Article III standing. Quite apart from the
fact that Rule 24’s text nowhere mentions standing, the requirements
of standing are almost antithetical to Rule 24’s requirements. Rule 24

60. In Lujan, the Supreme Court explained that, in addition to having a concrete and
particularized injury, the plaintiff must be “‘directly’ affected apart from [her] ‘special interest in
th[e] subject.’” Id. at 563 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739 (1972)). However, the Court later explained in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) that the prohibition on generalized grievances was part of “prudential
standing . . . [which is] closely related to Art. III concerns but [is] essentially [a] matter[] of judicial
self-governance.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12.
61. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014).
62. However, it should be acknowledged that the Roberts Court has liberalized standing in
a number of ways as well. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 292
(2008) (granting standing to assignees to pursue claims for money owed even when the assignee
has promised to remit the proceeds to the assignor); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535
(2007) (allowing Massachusetts to challenge the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking petition); Young,
supra note 56, at 157–58 (explaining that Lexmark “may have the unintended consequence of
loosening the causation element of constitutional standing”).
63. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1968) (finding taxpayer standing sufficient
to contest federal funding of parochial schools).
64. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
65. Id. at 563 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735, 739).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is broad enough to protect “relatively intangible [and] abstract”70
interests, including the potentially adverse effects of stare decisis;71
standing’s injury requirement, on the other hand, demands that the
plaintiff show she “‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury’ . . . [that is] both ‘real and immediate,’
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”72 Rule 24 asks whether the
plaintiff’s interest might be impaired as a result of inadequate
representation,73 which requires a judge to make a predictive, practical
determination; standing requires that the there be a “causal
connection” between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
conduct,74 which requires a judge to make a retrospective empirical and
legal determination. Rule 24 requires a showing that the plaintiff’s
interest will “as a practical matter” be “impair[ed]”;75 standing’s
redressability prong requires the plaintiff to show that her requested
relief will likely redress, not merely mitigate, her alleged injury.76
Perhaps most significant, whereas Rule 24(a)(2) is a filtering
mechanism meant to distinguish between parties who are entitled to
intervene and parties who are not, Article III standing is a
jurisdictional concept that defines and thereby limits the scope of the
federal judiciary’s power.77 Once Article III standing is satisfied by the
70. Tobias, supra note 21, at 419.
71. For cases that recognize adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable interest under Rule
24(a)(2), see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983).
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (entitling an interested party to intervene if their interest will
be impaired “unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”).
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
76. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) for instance, the Court denied the parents of black
public schoolchildren standing to challenge the IRS’s failure to revoke the tax-exempt status of
racially discriminatory private schools. Even though plaintiff’s “request might have a substantial
effect on the desegregation of public schools,” the Court denied standing because the children’s
inability to attend desegregated schools “might not be traceable to IRS violations of the law.”
Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
77. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (“[Standing]
preserves the ‘tripartite structure’ of our Federal Government, prevents the Federal Judiciary
from ‘intrud[ing] upon the powers given to the other branches,’ and ‘confines the federal courts
to a properly judicial role.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136
S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016))); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (“Federal judicial power is limited
to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated
powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220
(1993) (“The legitimacy of an unelected, life-tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is
bolstered by the constitutional limitation of that judiciary’s power in Article III to actual ‘cases’
and ‘controversies.’”).
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original parties, using standing as an additional filter against
intervening parties displaces the role of Rule 24(a)(2).
C. The Minority Circuits’ Approaches, Considered
The majority of circuits allow Rule 24 intervention without a
showing of Article III standing.78 The minority position—articulated
by the Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. circuits—requires that a Rule 24
intervenor satisfy Article III standing.79 The minority circuits’ position
rests on three distinct but interrelated justifications, which I refer to as
the categorical approach, the floodgates concern, and the equal footing
rationale.
1. The Eighth Circuit’s Categorical Approach. The first rationale,
articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf v. Babbitt,80 concerns the
supposed threat to Article III jurisdiction that intervenors pose.
Though the court recognized that “Rule 24(a) speaks to practical
concerns . . . [and] promotes the efficient and orderly use of judicial
resources by [consolidating litigation],”81 the Eighth Circuit took the
categorical position that “an Article III case or controversy, once
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an
Article III case or controversy.”82
Though it is generally undisputed that federal jurisdiction turns on
the invoking party’s satisfaction of Article III standing,83 applying this
requirement to all intervening parties presents two issues. First, the
consensus among commentators is that only the plaintiff invoking the

78. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated,
137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2014); Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2011); City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176,
1183–84 (10th Cir. 2010); Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37 & n.10 (11th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d
814, 829–30 (5th Cir. 1998).
79. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833–34, 833 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
80. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 1300.
82. Id.
83. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531, at 4–6 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13A WRIGHT & MILLER] (“The party
focused upon [in standing inquiries] is almost invariably the plaintiff. . . . [O]rdinarily the role of
defendants is considered only in determining whether they have caused the injury complained of
and whether an order directed to them will redress that injury.”).
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court’s jurisdiction must satisfy Article III standing.84 This position
accords with Lexmark’s interpretation of the purpose behind Article
III standing: to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim “presents a case
or controversy that is properly within federal courts’ Article III
jurisdiction.”85 Standing is a subject-matter limitation, and a court’s
jurisdiction, once vested, cannot be destroyed unless the original case
or controversy disappears.86 The minority position, by contrast, treats
standing as a freestanding set of criteria that all intervenors—even
defendants who are not traditionally required to demonstrate
standing87—must satisfy.
Second, the Eighth Circuit’s bright-line position—that adding any
party who lacks Article III standing destroys federal jurisdiction over
a case—is irreconcilable with the circuit’s treatment of permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b). For example, in Flynt v. Lombardi88 the
Eighth Circuit allowed an intervenor under Rule 24(b) despite
acknowledging that the intervenor lacked Article III standing.89
Because the intervenor sought only to unseal legal documents rather
than to litigate, the court reasoned that “an independent basis of
jurisdiction [was] not required.”90 This approach—examining the
intervenor’s purpose and determining whether it demands
independent standing—contrasts strongly with the Eighth Circuit’s
approach in Mausolf, in which the inclusion of a party lacking Article
III standing destroyed jurisdiction irrespective of the party’s motive.91
If the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf was correct on this point, Flynt appears
incorrectly decided, given that there is no principled distinction

84. See Karastelev, supra note 21, at 470–71 & n.98 (citing cases and commentary arguing
that only the plaintiff needs to have standing to establish a justiciable case or controversy).
85. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
86. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Once a valid Article III case-orcontroversy is present, the court’s jurisdiction vests. The presence of additional parties, although
they alone could independently not satisfy Article III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy
jurisdiction already established.”). For Supreme Court precedent suggesting that jurisdiction is
not destroyed by the presence of parties lacking Article III standing, see infra Part I.D.
87. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (explaining that standing applies to “the party who invokes the court’s
authority”); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 83, § 3531, at 4–6. But see Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (“Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-orcontroversy requirement.” (emphasis added)).
88. Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2015).
89. Id. at 967.
90. Id.
91. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
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between Rule 24(a)(2) and Rule 24(b) intervenors vis-à-vis Article
III.92
The larger issue with the Eighth Circuit’s position in Mausolf is
that it effectively writes Rule 24(b) out of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 24(b) allows permissive intervention if the party “has
a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question
of law or fact.”93 If, as these courts believe, Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest
requirement does not satisfy Article III, then Rule 24(b), which exists
to accommodate parties whose interest is not sufficient under Rule
24(a)(2),94 is without any meaning. How could a party’s interest be
sufficient to satisfy Article III yet insufficient to qualify for
intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)?95 Requiring Article III standing of
Rule 24(b) intervenors leaves the Rule without any conceivable
application.
2. The “Floodgates” Concern. Another oft-cited rationale for the
minority position is that allowing intervention without Article III
standing would permit “any organization or individual with only a
philosophic identification with a defendant—or a concern with a
possible unfavorable precedent . . . to intervene and influence the

92. A similar problem confronts the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a party be joined to existing litigation if “that person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action
in the person’s absence may . . . impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)–(B)(i). Rule 19’s language is almost identical to that of Rule 24, and,
according to the Eighth Circuit, the consequences of joining a party under Rule 19 who lacks
standing should be the same as doing so under Rule 24. Yet in applying Rule 19, the Eighth Circuit
does not inquire into the joined party’s standing. See, e.g., Two Shields v. Wilkinson, 790 F.3d 791,
798 (8th Cir. 2015) (omitting standing as a factor relevant to Rule 19 analysis); see also Karastelev,
supra note 21, at 470 (noting the Rule 19 issue).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
94. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1911, at 450–68 (explaining that Rule 24(b)
exists to allow intervention where Rule 24(a)(2) would not); see also SEC v. U.S. Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 (1940) (“[Rule 24(b)] plainly dispenses with any requirement
that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the
litigation.”).
95. For example, let’s say our plaintiff from Lujan wants to intervene in an ongoing ESA
suit, and her claims share a question of law or fact with the plaintiff’s claims. Suppose, though,
that her interest in the particular endangered species is not strong enough to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2),
meaning that it is also not strong enough to satisfy Article III standing (as she cannot have an
injury without at least a strong interest). Will her Rule 24(b) motion succeed if she is required to
satisfy Article III standing? No: she will fail because, given that she didn’t have an interest
sufficient for a Rule 24(a)(2) motion, she will not be able to satisfy Article III standing a fortiori.
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course of litigation.”96 As articulated by the Eighth Circuit, the fear is
that courts will be turned into “judicial versions of college debating
forums.”97 The circuits’ concern with misuse of judicial resources is
laudable, but the fear is misplaced.
First, it is doubtful as an empirical matter that the minority
circuits’ fear—that removing Article III standing from Rule 24
intervention will open the floodgates to any merely interested party—
has come to pass in the majority of circuits allowing intervention
without standing.98 Second, Rule 24(a)(2) contains three limiting
criteria, all of which the prospective intervenor must meet.99 It is
unlikely that someone with a merely “philosophic identification” with
a given defendant would have a sufficient interest under Rule 24(a)(2)
or be able to show how an adverse ruling would “impair or impede”
her ability to protect the interest.
Even if this is fear were well founded, Article III standing would
be the wrong way to address it. Recall that the Supreme Court in
Lexmark clarified that standing is strictly a matter of jurisdiction, not
prudence, by reiterating the “virtually unflagging” requirement that
“‘a federal court[] . . . hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction.”100
In the wake of Lexmark, the D.C. Circuit in Crossroads Grassroots
Policy Strategies v. FEC101 discontinued its application of the zone-ofinterest test—a prudential rather than Article III standing
requirement—to Rule 24 intervenors.102 Despite proclaiming in
Crossroads that “there is no need for another layer of judge-made

96. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J.,
concurring).
97. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)).
98. Though an imperfect proxy, the time period from filing date to final trial disposition is
longest in district courts of the Seventh Circuit (12.6 months), which applies Article III to
intervenors, and shortest in district courts of the Eleventh Circuit (8.48 months), which allows
intervenors without regard to standing. See U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS – COMPARISON WITHIN CIRCUIT – DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING JUNE
30, 2016 (June 30, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_dist
comparison0630.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XNT-PFUL].
99. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1908, at 295 (“As amended in 1966, Rule
24(a)(2) creates a threefold test for intervention of right . . . .”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)
(requiring that intervenors under 24(a)(2) demonstrate a protectable interest that may be
impaired unless the intervenor is allowed to defend it).
100. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)
(quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
101. Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir, 2015).
102. Id. at 319.
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prudential considerations to deny intervention,”103 the court cited
approvingly to a concurrence advocating for the prudential use of
Article III standing in Rule 24 cases.104 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit did
not technically violate Lexmark insofar as it did not resurrect the
prudential standing limitations Lexmark interred. However, by
appealing to a prudential (as opposed to jurisdictional) motivation for
invoking Article III standing, the D.C. Circuit violated the idea behind
Lexmark—that Article III standing is meant only to define jurisdiction.
3. The “Equal Footing” Rationale. The final rationale underlying
the minority position is that if an “intervenor seeks to participate on an
equal footing with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the
standing requirements imposed on those parties.”105 Because “an
intervenor may be seeking relief different from that sought by and of
the original parties . . . [which] may make it really a new case,”106 and
because no case can be sustained without Article III standing, the
potentially case-shifting intervenor must have standing. This is a fair
concern, as Rule 24 intervenors are presumptively107 given full-party
status, allowing them to participate in practically all aspects of the
trial.108 If an intervenor so changes the focus of a case such that it no
longer centers on the original plaintiff’s claims, the adjudicating court
may no longer have jurisdiction.
But this position overlooks two important points. First, many
parties who seek to intervene do so only to present different arguments
or evidence, not to request different relief.109 In these cases,
intervention functions in a similar way to an amicus brief, but with

103. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
104. Id. The case to which the court referred was Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717
F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013), in which Judge Silberman explained that “[the D.C. Circuit’s] rule
requiring all intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing prudently guards against [undue
intervention by third parties].” Id. at 195.
105. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
106. City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2011).
107. However, for a discussion of courts’ authority to limit intervenors’ powers under Rule
24(a)(2), see infra notes 112–113.
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s a general rule,
intervenors are permitted to litigate fully once admitted to a suit.” (alteration in original) (quoting
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1997))).
109. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the
intervenor sought to make arguments that “institutional pressures” prevented the original party
from making).
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important differences.110 Some parties intervene for much more limited
purposes, which may entail virtually no participation in the litigation.111
Second, this position overlooks the authority Rule 24 gives courts to
limit the participation of intervening parties. To be sure, the text of
Rule 24 confers no such power, but the Advisory Committee’s note to
the 1966 amendment grants courts broad, discretionary power to
condition intervenors’ activities.112 This power is widely recognized113
and compares favorably with Article III standing as a means of limiting
intervenor participation. Whereas Article III categorically rejects a
class of intervenors who might contribute valuably to the resolution of
a case, imposing limits under Rule 24 allows judges to take advantage
of the perspective and information offered by intervenors while
avoiding potential procedural complications.

110. For a consideration of why intervention is superior to an amicus brief for most parties,
see infra Part III.B.1.
111. For instance, some parties intervene to obtain information they can access only as a
party. See, e.g., Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2015) (permitting a party to
intervene who only sought to modify a protective order); Haworth v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090,
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the lower court’s refusal to allow a party to intervene who was
seeking discovery relevant to a parallel litigation with one of the original parties). Other parties
seek to intervene as neutral participants in settlement negotiations. See, e.g., United States v.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009) (refusing to permit the intervention
of a Missouri trade association in settlement negotiations between the United States, Missouri,
and the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District for violations of the Clean Water Act).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (“An
intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or
restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the
proceedings.”). Courts often will limit the intervenor’s ability to raise new claims. See, e.g., Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 n.8 (D.D.C. 2009) (allowing
parties to intervene “subject to limitations prohibiting them from raising claims outside the scope
of those raised by the original parties or from raising collateral issues”). Courts also frequently
limit the intervenor’s discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d
560, 565–66 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (limiting intervenors’ “ability to initiate unilateral independent
discovery without leave of the court”).
113. See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 528 (1972) (remanding
to “allow limited intervention” under Rule 24); Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States,
317 F.R.D. 6, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is now a firmly established principle that reasonable
conditions may be imposed even upon one who intervenes as of right.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Beauregard, Inc. v. Sword Servs. L.L.C., 107 F.3d 351, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1997))); United
States v. Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386, 1396 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); Dacotah Chapter of Sierra
Club v. Salazar, No. 1:12-cv-065, 2012 WL 3686742, at *2 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2012) (same); Florida
Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, No. 3:78-cv-178-J-34MCR, 2011 WL
4459387, at *11 n.13 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011) (same); United States v. Arch Coal, Inc., No. 2:110133, 2011 WL 2493072, at *12 (S.D. W. Va. June 22, 2011) (same); TiVo Inc. v. AT & T Inc., No.
2:09-CV-259, 2010 WL 10922068, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) (same).

FERGUSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

RULE 24 NOTWITHSTANDING

9/18/2017 12:13 PM

207

D. The Supreme Court’s Sub Silentio Treatment
The Supreme Court has expressly declined to resolve whether
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention requires Article III standing when the
movant does not seek different relief.114 Though the Court has not
supplied a definitive answer, it has “sub silentio” endorsed the majority
position.115 In Diamond v. Charles,116 the Court ruled that when the
original party declines to appeal a judgment, an intervenor must
demonstrate separate Article III standing to appeal.117 This makes
perfect sense: the original plaintiff in Diamond, the State of Illinois,
dropped out of the litigation after the court of appeals’ decision, taking
with it the original case or controversy and, a fortiori, the Supreme
Court’s Article III jurisdiction.118 But “[h]ad the State sought
review . . . Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be
entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and
to seek leave to argue orally.”119 That is, Diamond would have been
treated as a full party, but his “ability to ride ‘piggyback’ on the State’s
undoubted standing exist[ed] only if the State [had] in fact [been] an
appellant before the Court.”120 Though the Court in Diamond declined
to define the general relationship between Article III and Rule
24(a)(2), the Court’s dictum suggests that standing-less intervenors are
able to “piggyback” on the standing of the original plaintiff.121
Since Diamond, the Supreme Court has given more authority to
Diamond’s dictum, albeit obliquely. In McConnell v. FEC,122 the Court
considered a challenge to sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act defended by the FEC and numerous defendant-intervenors.

114. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1986) (“We need not decide today whether
a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.”).
115. Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is fair to say
that while the Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed our approach, it has sub silentio
permitted parties to intervene in cases that satisfy the ‘case or controversy’ requirement without
determining whether those parties independently have standing.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1645
(2017).
116. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id. at 63–64.
119. Id. at 64.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Though one plaintiff raised the issue of intervenor standing,123 the
Court ultimately ruled on the merits of the suit without determining
that the defendant-intervenors had standing.124 As the Court explained,
because “the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) has standing . . . we
need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose
position here is identical to the FEC’s.”125 In other words, the Court
considered the defendant-intervenors’ standing irrelevant because
they had made substantially the same arguments as the FEC, which did
have standing.
Though this sentence sounds like a bit of forgettable throat
clearing, it is significant given McConnell’s procedural posture.
Whereas Diamond was a case about Article III jurisdiction, McConnell
was decided on the merits. Accordingly, McConnell had to have
presented a justiciable case or controversy or else the Court would not
have had jurisdiction to rule on the merits.126 But if the minority’s,
particularly the Eighth Circuit’s, interpretation is correct, the Court
could not have decided the case on the merits without first finding that
all of the many defendant-intervenors had standing. Were even one of
them to lack standing, the case would not be justiciable. That
McConnell was decided on the merits, therefore, casts substantial
doubt on the proposition that “an Article III case or controversy, once
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an
Article III case or controversy.”127
The Court’s dictum in Diamond and its ruling in McConnell
strongly suggest that Rule 24 intervenors need not have Article III
standing. At the very least, these decisions critically undermine the
hard-line position taken by the Eighth Circuit in Mausolf. More
123. Id. at 233.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (rejecting “hypothetical
jurisdiction” because “it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and
thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers”); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has “an
obligation to assure [itself] that [plaintiffs have] Article III standing at the outset of the
litigation”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (declining to issue a writ of
mandamus because the applicable statute could not confer original jurisdiction).
127. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). Minority circuits have not
addressed the discrepancy between their position and the Supreme Court’s one-plaintiff rule
whereby the Supreme Court proceeds to the merits of a case without determining that all plaintiffs
have standing. For an analysis of the one-plaintiff rule and its use by federal courts, see generally
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec.
2017).
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broadly, these decisions call into question the validity of applying
Article III to Rule 24 intervenors at all. If the inclusion of an intervenor
without standing does not destroy Article III jurisdiction, and if Article
III is a jurisdictional limitation rather than a filtering mechanism, it is
unclear how one could justify excluding intervenors without appealing
to prudential concerns alone. Ultimately, if only prudential concerns
justify application of Article III to intervenors, the minority position is
all the more dubious after Lexmark.
II. RULE 24 AND THE TWO PROCESS CONCERNS OF STARE DECISIS
As Part I demonstrates, there is no conclusive answer to the
question of whether Rule 24 requires that intervenors demonstrate
Article III standing. Given this stalemate, the rest of this Note argues
that two considerations—due process and the process of judicial
decisionmaking—cut in favor of allowing parties to intervene without
demonstrating standing. Because stare decisis requires courts to follow
precedent, it is important that cases be decided correctly—that is, by
taking into account the manifold ways a decision will affect future
litigants—in the first instance.
A. The Scope of Strength of Stare Decisis
It was once a widely held view that “judicial opinions were of little
import.”128 Principles of vertical and horizontal stare decisis required
courts to follow the holdings of their superior (and sometimes
coordinate) courts, but the opinions were virtually without force.129
This argument still has its proponents, and there are a number of ways
in which this position is formally correct.130 But as anyone who has
written a case brief can attest, those in the legal field—particularly
attorneys—place substantial importance on the rationales of legal
decisions, not just their holdings. This attention to legal opinions, as
opposed to holdings alone, is well founded as courts often treat their
opinions as if they set general rules for society that affect parties
beyond the scope of the instant case.131 That this occurs is not exactly a

128. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 974 (2009).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 975 & n.45.
131. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–8 (1984) (“Today cases often are just excuses for
the creation or alteration of [societal] rules.”).
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secret.132 Though the precedential weight we give to opinions reflects a
fairness-driven preference for “treating like cases alike,”133 it is also a
functional requirement of our system. As the Ninth Circuit put it:
The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the
narrow facts before it in a particular case. In the decision of individual
cases the Court must and regularly does establish guidelines to govern
a variety of situations related to that presented in the immediate case.
The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard
such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the
case in which the guidelines were announced.134

It is thus not surprising that people at all levels of the legal profession—
students, professors, lawyers, and judges—pay close attention to
judicial opinions.
What is perhaps surprising is the preclusive effect courts give to
opinions. It would be one thing if, as the Ninth Circuit describes, the
broad reach of judicial opinions established flexible “guidelines”
judges could apply with some discretion. In practice, however, judicial
opinions are more binding than guiding. Once a judicial opinion is
issued by an appellate court on a given matter of law, that
interpretation will, absent extraordinary circumstances,135 govern
future cases within the same jurisdiction regardless of the arguments
future parties may advance against it.136 Horizontal stare decisis, which
requires courts to follow their coordinate courts’ decisions, functions
primarily at the appellate level137 where doctrinal rules require judges
132. See, e.g., Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of
our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law.”); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“While
individual cases turn upon the controversies between parties, or involve particular prosecutions,
court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at large.”).
133. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
624 (1958).
134. United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983).
135. For a discussion of stare decisis and the grounds on which federal courts may overrule
precedent, see infra notes 139–154 and accompanying text.
136. The exception to this rule is Rule 11, which allows a party to make “a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). For reasons discussed below, there is substantial risk in making this type of
Rule 11 argument. For an explanation of the circumstances under which Rule 11 sanctions are
levied, see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
137. Horizontal stare decisis is significantly less important at the district level, and sometimes
completely unimportant. Courts in at most one district are required to follow intra-circuit
precedent. See Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843 (S. D. Ohio 2010) (“In the absence of
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to follow the decision of a previous panel unless a subsequent en banc
or Supreme Court decision overrules it.138 For example, if the Ninth
Circuit holds in Litigant A’s case that “no vehicles in the park” means
literally no vehicles, Litigant B effectively cannot argue that the rule
should apply only to certain types of vehicles. Horizontal stare decisis
prevents any panel within the circuit from ruling contrary to a previous
panel’s decision. Litigant B’s only recourse is to obtain en banc or
Supreme Court review. But mere error correction is almost certainly
not going to get him there. En banc review is granted only when a case
presents a “question of exceptional importance” or one on which
panels within the circuit have disagreed.139 Similarly, the Supreme
Court grants petitions for certiorari only when a case presents an issue
of national importance or is one on which the circuit courts have split.140
As a result, “[f]irst-in-time litigants usually receive the only
opportunity to air arguments on the merits of a legal issue.”141
Assume, perhaps, that the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court is
eager to revisit the interpretation of “no vehicles in the park,” and so
agrees to hear Litigant B’s case. Even in this improbable scenario, stare
decisis further prevents courts from overruling themselves absent
special circumstances. As the Supreme Court explained in Planned

supervening case authority from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, this Court is bound,
under the doctrine of stare decisis, to follow decisions of its own judges.”). But see Michael R.
Mertz, Comment to Eugene Volokh, District Court Opinions Precedential Within the Same
District?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2010, 8:33 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/25/districtcourt-opinions-precedential-within-the-same-district [https://perma.cc/FN8S-AJ49] (providing
comment of Magistrate Judge Michael Merz, author of the opinion in Kerr v. Hurd,
acknowledging that “[t]he comments [on the Volokh Conspiracy] persuade me the quoted
statement from my opinion is wrong”). In other jurisdictions, there is a presumption in favor of
following intra-district precedent. See United States v. Hirschorn, 21 F.2d 758, 759 (S.D.N.Y.
1927) (explaining that “the general rule [is] that a matter which is decided by any District Judge
in this district should be, as a matter of comity, without re-examination by another judge, so
decided”). In general, “federal district court decisions are treated like unpublished appellate
decisions: they may be disregarded in future cases except for the purposes of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.” Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial
Power to “Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 168 (2001).
138. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1018
n.20 (2003) (noting that every circuit follows the rule that one panel cannot override another).
139. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (“We take cases en banc . . . not just to review a panel
opinion for error . . . .”). The rule that no panel can overrule another is not grounded in statute
and is sometimes ignored. See generally Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law,
76 MARQUETTE L. REV. 755 (1993) (analyzing the origins and application of the interpanel rule).
140. SUP. CT. R. 10.
141. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1017.
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,142 the presumption
of stare decisis in the federal judiciary143 is so strong that precedent
cannot be overruled unless a series of factors weighs against it. To be
overruled, precedent should be “unworkable”144 and should be
discredited by subsequent factual145 and legal146 developments. It
should also not have engendered “reliance,”147—in a more general than
legal sense148—and the overruling should not appear to be so
ideologically motivated as to tarnish the court’s reputation.149 The
Court in Casey identified only two precedents, Lochner v. New York150
and Plessy v. Ferguson,151 that ticked all of the boxes.152 To be clear,
precedents have been overruled even when they have not met one or
more of the conditions enumerated in Casey,153 but there is a strong
presumption in federal courts against overruling precedent.154

142. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
143. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1018–19 (noting that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor any of
the courts of appeals will overrule precedent absent ‘special justification,’” which includes an
examination of the Casey factors).
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
145. Id. at 860.
146. Id. at 857.
147. Id. at 855–56.
148. As one commentator has explained:
While many people may have strong ideological or personal stakes in the [legality of
abortion] being decided one way or another, there is relatively little “reliance” in the
sense of the existing rule having tended to create its own reliance—having caused
people to “sink costs,” so to speak. There is, for example, less investment-backed social
expectation in a particular legal regime concerning abortion than there was for
continuation of “separate but equal” under Plessy v. Ferguson.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1554–55 (2000).
149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861, 865–66.
150. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
151. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–63.
153. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007)
(noting that “[r]eliance interests do not require us to reaffirm [an incorrect precedent]”); Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 558 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for overruling what “[l]ess than three years ago . . . in [a] unanimous decision” had
been considered “settled constitutional doctrine”).
154. This presumption is even stronger in certain contexts. For example, when a court
interprets a federal statute and Congress fails to amend it, the lack of amendment is seen as
approval of the court’s interpretation. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998)
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and
Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989))).
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B. Stare Decisis’s Process Problems
The strength of stare decisis in the federal judiciary implicates two
separate processes. The first is procedural due process, which is
undermined by stare decisis as practiced in the federal judiciary. The
second is the judicial decisionmaking process, which is complicated by
the epistemic constraints of case-based rulemaking and the adversarial
presentation of evidence in our legal system. These two process
concerns are considered below in turn.
1. Due Process. The Constitution twice guarantees that the
government will not deprive anyone of “life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”155 In the context of judicial proceedings
and other types of individualized adjudications, due process includes
the right to be heard on the merit of one’s claims and defenses.156 By
effectively foreclosing the litigation of certain issues decided in
previous cases, stare decisis is in tension with this right: in a significant
sense, stare decisis limits the ability to be heard in anything more than
a literal sense on one’s claims and defenses. For instance, a defendant
who wants to argue that the employees of her riverboat casino are not
“seamen” for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act is
effectively barred in the Seventh Circuit from doing so, whether or not
her arguments were heard in the precedent-setting case or the case was
even decidedly correctly.157
Federal courts have rarely addressed the tension between stare
decisis and due process. When they have, their reasoning has been
more obscuring than illuminating. In Colby v. J.C. Penney Co.,158 the
Seventh Circuit reversed a district judge for treating the precedent of
another district court as outcome determinative in a sex discrimination
suit.159 Because “the parties to cases before us are entitled to [the
judge’s] independent judgment,” the district court erred by treating the
precedent as binding rather than persuasive.160 Similarly, in Northwest

155. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
156. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996) (“The opportunity to be
heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings.”).
157. See Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The
doctrine of stare decisis ‘imparts authority to a decision, depending on the court that rendered it,
merely by virtue of the authority of the rendering court and independently of the quality of its
reasoning.’” (quoting Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2005))).
158. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).
159. Id. at 1128.
160. Id. at 1123.
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Forest Resource Council v. Dombeck,161 the D.C. Circuit reversed its
district court for treating out-of-circuit district court precedent as
binding in a challenge to an environmental plan.162 Because the district
court was not compelled to follow another circuit, the district court had
“deprive[d] appellants of their right to be heard on the merits of their
claims.”163 Although these decisions pay some attention to the
preclusive effects of stare decisis, it is unclear what they stand for. As
one commentator has noted, “Dombeck and Colby raise more
questions than they answer.”164 Both the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in
these cases flagged the potential due process concerns underlying the
issue-preclusive effects of stare decisis. By highlighting the nonbinding
nature of other-circuit and other-district precedent, however, the
courts imply that analogous precedent from an appropriate source
would not present the same due process concern.165 The salience of this
distinction is less than clear. Precluding consideration of certain issues
because of stare decisis burdens the right to be heard regardless of the
precedent’s source; whatever the precedent’s pedigree, the instant
litigant is effectively precluded by the resolution of someone else’s case
from making a claim in hers.
This blind spot likely owes to the traditional understanding of
stare decisis.166 In the common law, stare decisis was considered a
doctrine that applied to judges rather than parties. In justifying the life
tenure of federal judges, Alexander Hamilton explained:
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of
controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind,
that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very
considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to
acquire a competent knowledge of them.167

161. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at 901.
163. Id. at 898.
164. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1027.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1031 (“To the extent that the traditional account [of stare decisis] has focused
on precedent’s binding effect, it has focused on judges.”).
167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001) (emphasis
added).
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In a similar but more recent vein, the Federal Circuit has described
stare decisis as “a doctrine that binds courts” but “does not bind
parties.”168 Though that might be true in a formal sense, stare decisis
inevitably affects future parties by binding judges to follow prior
decisions: a judge who is commanded by stare decisis to follow a
previous court’s interpretation of “all vehicles” is a judge whose
litigants effectively cannot contest that interpretation.
The judicial treatment of stare decisis is even more questionable
when one compares it to the doctrine of issue preclusion.169 Like stare
decisis, issue preclusion promotes judicial efficiency and consistency by
binding litigants to prior judgments of the same issue.170 Unlike stare
decisis, however, issue preclusion bars a party from litigating a certain
issue only if the party had a “full and fair opportunity”171 to do so
previously. In contemporary doctrine, parties can be precluded from
litigating an issue only if they were a party in previous litigation in
which the issue was resolved, or if they were in privity with such a party.
The doctrinal treatment of stare decisis, on the other hand, evinces no
such concern for due process. Stare decisis assumes a prior resolution
of a particular issue binds future parties, even if those parties had no
hand in the precedent-setting litigation and thus had no opportunity to
be heard.172
The traditional explanation for why issue preclusion and stare
decisis treat parties differently is the putative flexibility of stare
decisis.173 Issue preclusion is rigid—once an issue is settled, it is settled

168. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–
74 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
169. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1032–43 (comparing the judicial treatment of stare decisis
to that of res judicata).
170. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1979) (explaining that defensive
issue preclusion is meant to deny litigants the ability to relitigate issues by “merely ‘switching
adversaries’” (quoting Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813
(1942))).
171. Id. at 328.
172. See Bethesda Lutheran Homes & Servs., Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[S]tare decisis . . . bars a different party from obtaining the overruling of a decision. The
existence of different parties is assumed by the doctrine, rather than being something that takes
a case outside its reach.”).
173. See id. (“Of course, stare decisis is a less rigid doctrine than res judicata. But it is not a
noodle.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“When
the issue involved is one of law, stability of decision can be regulated by the rule of issue preclusion
or by the more flexible rule of stare decisis.”); Barrett, supra note 138, at 1043–47 (suggesting “the
supposed flexibility of stare decisis” as the reason “the doctrines [of issue preclusion and stare
decisis] treat nonparties differently”).
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for the purposes of all litigation involving the same parties or privies.
Stare decisis, on the other hand, is considered to be more flexible
inasmuch as parties can distinguish their cases from precedent, appeal
an unfavorable decision, or make nonfrivolous arguments that a
precedent should be overruled. As intuitive as this seems, the
distinction is greater in theory than in practice. There is a limit on the
ability of courts to distinguish one case from another.174 And the ability
to distinguish does not make stare decisis any more flexible: the act of
distinguishing a case is one of arguing why the instant facts are
materially different from those of a precedential case. The act of
distinguishing assumes stare decisis binds but argues that the instant
case is not within the scope of the binding precedent.
At the appellate level, the ability to appeal turns entirely on the
authority of the precedent—for example, appealing a district versus
appellate court decision—and whether the appealed issue is
sufficiently important to merit (re-)consideration in the context of en
banc and Supreme Court appeals.175 If the authority is sufficiently
great, or the urged basis of appeal is mere error correction, one is
unlikely to obtain review. Though Rule 11(b)(2) does allow one to
make nonfrivolous arguments for the reversal of precedent,176 the same
Rule 11 mandates sanctions for arguments that are not “reasonable,”177
thereby deterring challenges to precedent. Moreover, because Rule
11(b)(2) challenges ask judges to render a decision despite the weight
of precedent, such challenges are often likely to fail. Consequently, an
attorney facing pressure from clients to reduce litigation costs is likely
to stay away from Rule 11 arguments that, even when well made, are
unlikely to persuade.
Under current doctrine, stare decisis and issue preclusion similarly
preclude parties from relitigating issues once decided, yet due process
limits only issue preclusion. But perhaps this is the wrong way to think
174. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1021 (“A court’s capacity for ‘honest’ distinguishing . . .
does somewhat blunt a case’s effect on later litigants. Court cannot, however, fairly distinguish
every case.”).
175. For an examination of stare decisis in the federal judiciary, see supra Part II.A.
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (allowing parties to make “a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).
177. See Corroon v. Reeve, 258 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Rule 11 is violated when it is clear
under existing precedents that a pleading has no chance of success and there is no reasonable
argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it stands.”). But see McKnight v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 511 U.S. 659, 660 (1994) (per curiam) (providing that an argument is not frivolous if, though
“foreclosed by Circuit precedent,” it concerns an issue that has “divided the District Courts and
its answer [is] not so clear as to make [the] position frivolous”).
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of it. Maybe the explanation for courts’ reluctance to apply due process
to stare decisis has less to do with the effects of the two doctrines than
with the relationship between precedent-setting courts and future
litigants. As one commentator has noted, Colby and Dombeck could
stand for the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a full
hearing on the merits of one’s arguments only in matters of first
impression.178 Under this theory, a precedent-setting court would sit as
adjudicator to the instant litigants, but would function like a legislative
rulemaker as to future parties. Because legislatures and other
rulemaking bodies are not required by due process to afford a hearing
to potentially affected parties,179 why should courts do so when acting
in this capacity?
The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence distinguishes
between adjudicatory acts involving individualized deprivations of life,
liberty, and property, and legislative enactments, which affect large
groups of people.180 Whereas adjudication requires procedural
safeguards, the Supreme Court made clear in Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization181 that rights are protected from
legislative deprivations by the political process.182 The distinction
between adjudications and legislative enactments, however, does little
to resolve the issue posed by judicial rulemakings, which are
adjudications in some senses and rulemakings in others. Instead, we
must look to the rationale behind the adjudication-rulemaking
distinction. When a legislature passes a broadly applicable law, citizens’
“rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the
rule.”183 Because the electoral process affords enough protection
against bad lawmaking, due process does not require the right to be
heard. Such a requirement would make impossible the already difficult
task of enacting legislation. But when a decision affects only a few
people, electoral redress is less significant a check on bad or unfair
178. Barrett, supra note 138, at 1053.
179. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (explaining
that due process does not require individual hearings for those affected by generally applicable
statutes).
180. Compare id., with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (explaining that
individualized tax assessments for local improvements are adjudicatory and require notice and
the opportunity to be heard).
181. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
182. Id. at 445 (explaining that people are protected from legislative deprivations “by their
power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”).
183. Id.
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decisionmaking. In such cases, due process requires the opportunity to
be heard.184 On this account, the degree to which an affected group is
entitled to a hearing is inversely related to the degree of electoral
control the group can potentially exert on the rulemaker.
Like generally applicable laws, precedents affect potentially very
large groups of future litigants. Consequently, the sort of democratic
coalition building Bi-Metallic contemplates as a means to correct an
unpopular decision is possible. This, however, is where the story must
end, for judicial opinions—though they may draw a broad and diverse
crowd of opponents—are not readily subject to electoral change.
Federal judges are, by design, rulemakers insulated from the electoral
process.185 And, although there are some judicial interpretations that
can be changed through the legislative process, the Cooper v. Aaron186
principle of judicial supremacy limits this to judicial interpretations of
nonconstitutional law.187 Absent from judicial precedent is the crucial
ingredient—feasible political redressability188—that separates rules
from adjudications in the context of due process.
2. Judicial Decisionmaking. The strength of stare decisis in the
federal judiciary implicates another process: the decisionmaking
process. The Constitution requires federal judicial rulemaking to take
place in the context of concrete cases and controversies. This raises two
concerns. First, the epistemic constraints of case-based decisionmaking
inevitably lead judges to over- and underemphasize the importance of
certain facts relative to the unknown facts of future cases that will come
under the precedent’s rule. Second, because parties in a case are most
immediately concerned with winning, they have an incentive not to
present information that, although it might be useful in the
determination of the broader rule, is either contrary or neutral to their
position in the litigation.

184. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385–86.
185. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing life tenure of federal judges); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 167, at 405 (arguing that “permanent tenure” is necessary for
judges to serve as “bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments”).
186. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
187. Id. at 18 (“No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against [the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution] without violating his undertaking to support it.”).
188. In a formal sense, disappointed parties have the ability to invalidate judicial
interpretations of nonconstitutional, statutory law via the legislative process. But this ability is
generally much more theoretical than it is practical. For an explanation of why the legislative
process is often an inadequate means to overrule precedent, see infra Part III.B.3.
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a. Bad Cases Make Bad Law, But So Can Good Ones. Courtissued legal rules are products of the common law method, which, for
reasons discussed below, can be a sub-optimal decisionmaking process.
To understand the durability of the common law method, one must
first understand the historical context in which it became a facet of
American law. Writing in 1870, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that
“[i]t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards.”189 At the time, many still believed
in the classical conception of law—that objectively correct legal
answers could be deduced from universal principles of logic and
morality.190 Holmes knew better,191 and the legal world is now generally
disabused of the notion that positive law ultimately derives from
transcendental principles of logic or morality.192 But the presumption
that the resolution of cases makes for good law—the common law
method, as Holmes described it—is still baked into our legal structure.
The Case or Controversy Clause,193 from which the modern doctrine of
standing derives,194 requires that judges limit their jurisdiction to actual
cases lest their opinion be merely advisory, and therefore prohibited.195
Though standing has been justified on a number of grounds, one of the
most frequently invoked is the doctrine’s requirement that the plaintiff
allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of

189. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1
(1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725 (1931).
190. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 847 (1935) (rejecting the classical conception’s view of “judicial decisions” as “products
of logical parthenogenesis born of pre-existing legal principles”).
191. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897)
(rejecting the idea that the law is “a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or
what not”).
192. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006)
(“[Holmes] fully appreciated that common law judges made law in the process of deciding cases,
and nowadays few think otherwise. Common law method is not simply the discovery of immanent
law, but rather an approach in which the decision of live disputes in concrete contexts guides the
lawmaking function.”).
193. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
194. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–98 (1968) (explaining that “[s]tanding is an
aspect of justiciability” and “[j]usticiability is the term of art employed to give expression to . . .
the case-and-controversy doctrine”).
195. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65–66
(7th ed. 2011) (noting that the prohibition against advisory opinions has been termed “the oldest
and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability”); Letter from Chief Justice Jay and
Associate Justices to President Washington (July 20, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 487, 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891).
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issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions[.]”196 If courts are confined to the
information presented in the instant case, the rationale goes, that
information should come from parties who are sufficiently motivated
to make the best arguments.
Despite the common law method’s undoubted advantages, there
is reason to be skeptical. The common law method relies on the notion
that judges will better resolve a given legal question if they have a live
controversy before them. It is only with a live controversy, the
argument goes, that judges can see how a given rule plays out in real
life; it “sharpens the presentation of issues.”197 Were judges free to
issue opinions absent a concrete case, they might fail to consider the
unpredictable ways in which a given law is actually enforced.198 Still, a
case-based rulemaker is put in an awkward position. She must
simultaneously resolve the immediate case and use the case’s specific
facts to determine a general rule to apply to similarly situated future
parties. In determining the types of disputes that will fall under the
rule, the facts of the immediate case create “a substantial risk that the
common law rulemaker will be unduly influenced by the particular case
before her.”199 This concern is less pressing if the immediate case is
representative of future cases falling under the rule. But if the instant
case is not representative of the class of cases that will fall under the
future rule, the chance that a judge will place undue importance on the
facts of the present case is high. Judges “make this (mis-)assessment
[of representativeness] not on the basis of a rational survey of the class,
and not on the basis of systematic empirical examination, but instead
largely on the basis of the usually irrelevant factors of proximity or ease
of recall.”200 This phenomenon, called the “availability heuristic,”201 is
exacerbated by the phenomenon of “anchoring,”202 through which the
characteristics of the first event (a precedent-setting case, for instance)

196. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
197. Id.
198. Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (explaining the doctrine of ripeness
as a method to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” over questions of law).
199. Schauer, supra note 192, at 894.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790–92 (2001) (demonstrating a statistically significant influence of
anchoring on judicial decisionmaking).
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influence the estimation of subsequent events (hypothetical future
parties to whom the precedent will apply, for example). Consequently,
even a judge who is aware that future circumstances might differ from
the present case—who, in other words, is aware of the availability
heuristic’s influence—might be unable to escape the anchoring
influence the present case has on her ability to assess the field of future
disputes.203
b. The Distortive Effect of Adversarial Information. The problems
inherent in case-based rulemaking are not merely issues of framing and
anchoring. The information presented in litigation is not only
sometimes inadequate, but biased by design. Because parties in the
adversarial context are trying to win rather than reach the best legal or
factual conclusion, they are motivated to present less-thancomprehensive assessments of a given decision’s legal ramifications.204
Even when litigants do not intentionally filter information in this
fashion, the generalist nature of most lawyers and judges presents
additional information-related concerns. Because generalist judges
rely on the adversarial process to explain highly technical, specialized
issues, process errors can occur when a given lawyer does not
adequately understand the issue and, therefore, does not present the
most relevant or reliable information.205 The resulting decision may
accordingly be distorted.
As the preceding Section argues, stare decisis poses two general
process problems. The first concerns due process and, specifically, the
preclusive effect stare decisis has on parties’ ability to fully present
their claims. The second concerns the judicial decisionmaking process
and, in particular, the distortive effects of case-based decisionmaking
and adversarial information. Though perhaps an unlikely hero, Rule

203. Schauer, supra note 192, at 897.
204. See, e.g., William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court’s
Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685, 1725 (1994) (noting that
lawyers in tax cases tend to “focus[] on traditional [precedential] arguments” because they have
“no incentive to offer fundamental analysis, a new approach, or a critique of the existing set of
rules”).
205. See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1981). Wolfman explains:
Hardly an enclave of tax experts, the Supreme Court relies for illumination and
protection on the validity of a basic assumption of the adversary process: that strong
and effective advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments
for each side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result.
Id.

FERGUSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/2017 12:13 PM

222

[Vol. 67:189

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

24(a)(2)—unfettered by Article III standing—has the ability to greatly
reduce the effect of these process problems.
III. INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY
In light of the problems outlined in Part II, commentators have
proposed a more flexible approach to stare decisis206 or a system of
notice-and-comment judicial rulemaking.207 There is much to be said
for these and other proposals, but they would require federal
legislation, a reconception of stare decisis, or both. As luck would have
it, a far more practical remedy already exists in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Rule 24(a)(2).
A. Rule 24(a)(2) and Stare Decisis’s Process Errors
First, as discussed above at Part II.B, the preclusive effect of stare
decisis can constrain a litigant’s ability to argue certain issues such that,
in some cases, one’s right to a hearing seems like an empty formality.
Rule 24 mitigates this effect by allowing parties who will potentially be
subject to a given decision’s precedential effect to intervene and
influence the result.208 For instance, imagine that a court is interpreting
the government’s application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a
manufacturer (Graft Foods) and a retailer (Fraud Meyer) who entered
into a vertical agreement to fix a minimum resale price for a certain
macaroni product. The Sherman Antitrust Act’s text empowers the
government to prohibit “[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy[] in restraint of trade,”209 and asks that federal courts
determine the types of behavior that fall under the Act’s prohibition.210
Vertical price restraints can be seen as a practice that inhibits211 or
206. See Barrett, supra note 138, at 1060–61 (“Without flexibility, stare decisis functions as a
doctrine of preclusion, and its application to nonparty litigants poses the same due process
problem as the application of issue preclusion to nonparty litigants.”).
207. See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 128, at 967–68 (arguing that “[a]lthough it would
represent a significant change,” it seems “the case for notice-and-comment judicial
decisionmaking is in most respects at least as strong as the case for notice-and-comment
administrative rulemaking”).
208. For cases in which courts have recognized adverse stare decisis effect as a cognizable
interest under Rule 24(a)(2), see supra note 47.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
210. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“The legislative
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the [Sherman
Act’s] broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”).
211. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384–85 (1911) (banning
vertical price restraints because they are anticompetitive).
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sometimes promotes212 trade depending on the context, so the case
could go either way. That is, the court could create a per se rule against
vertical price restraints or create a more flexible standard that permits
them when they are effectively procompetitive. Many industries
comprising many parties will be affected by this ruling; vertical price
restraints are not exactly a niche practice.213 In this scenario, a
straightforward application of Rule 24(a)(2) would entitle other
companies to defend their interests by participating in the litigation.
These parties, much like the intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger,214
might very well make arguments that Graft Foods and Fraud Meyer
have incentives not to make.215 Or perhaps vertical price restraints are
not as important in the macaroni industry as they are in other sectors.
Were this the case, Graft Foods might not argue the case as vigorously
as would a company more significantly affected by a potentially
adverse precedent. Requiring Article III standing would likely
preclude many of these intervenors from defending their interests.
Unlike under Rule 24(a)(2), an adverse stare decisis effect does not
count among the injuries that satisfy Article III standing.216 A party
alleging stare decisis harm can intervene only if Article III does not
apply to Rule 24(a)(2).
It is important to note that Rule 24(a)(2) intervention can protect
the interests of future litigants even when they themselves do not
intervene. The greater the number of parties in the precedent-setting
litigation, the greater the chance that one of the parties will anticipate
the interests of future litigants. For instance, in the example above, if
Shady Records, Inc. is allowed to intervene in the Graft Foods
litigation, the interests of future music publishers will, in theory, be
212. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 906–07 (2007)
(overruling Dr. Miles’s per se ban on vertical price agreements because they can be efficient).
213. For instance, Apple, Inc. was recently required to pay a $450 million settlement in a
price-fixing scheme involving e-book publishers selling on the iTunes platform. See Brian X. Chen
& Nicole Perlroth, Settlement in Apple Case Over E-Books is Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2014), https://nyti.ms/2ts2V7Q [https://perma.cc/3VQG-LJMY].
214. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1999).
215. For a description of the intervenors, see supra note 19.
216. Such an injury would likely not be the “concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” or “actual and
imminent” injury required by standing. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003), overruled on
other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr.
Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (arguing for
application of Article III standing to intervenors as a means to avoid intervention by parties with
“a concern with a possible unfavorable precedent”); 13A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 83,
§ 3531.4, at 138–295 (noting no decision in which adverse stare decisis effect was a sufficient injury
to confer standing).

FERGUSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/2017 12:13 PM

224

[Vol. 67:189

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

protected better than if Shady Records were excluded. Though this is
no substitute for the right to be heard on one’s own claims, this sort of
virtual representation at least softens stare decisis’s blow.
Similarly, Rule 24(a)(2) potentially ameliorates the rule-distorting
effects of case-based adjudication, as discussed above in Part II.B.2.
Although judges may still be influenced by the availability heuristic,
the ability of other affected parties to intervene decreases the odds that
the availability heuristic will lead judges to misconstrue the class of
litigants to whom the rule will apply. In other words, as the number of
parties increases, so too does the degree to which the instant parties
represent the class of people who will later be affected by the decision’s
precedent. The effect of anchoring is similarly mitigated insofar as the
characteristics by which judges assess the possible class of future
litigants will be more representative of the class of people affected by
the decision. And, lest judges be concerned that intervening parties will
hijack the litigation, Rule 24(a)(2) allows judges the ability to limit the
intervening parties’ activities.217
The benefits of allowing intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) without
requiring Article III standing are even clearer when one considers how
stare decisis affects the federal judiciary’s legitimacy. The rest of this
Note considers this relationship and evaluates the alternatives
available to would-be intervenors.
1. Rule 24(a)(2) and Legitimacy. Rule 24(a)(2)’s enhancement of
the rulemaking process implicates a related judicial value: legitimacy.
As Alexander Hamilton recognized in Federalist No. 78, the federal
judiciary has “no influence over . . . the sword or the purse.”218
Consequently, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the federal
judiciary’s “power lies . . . in its legitimacy.”219 The public’s perception
of the judiciary’s legitimacy is determined by a number of factors,
foremost among them the degree to which a court’s decisions and
procedures comport with the public understanding of procedural
justice.220 Whether members of the general public consider a given legal
decision procedurally just turns in large part on whether they feel they
“have an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities” or
217. For a discussion of courts’ authority to limit intervenors’ activity, see supra notes 112–
113 and accompanying text.
218. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 167, at 402.
219. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
220. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 663 (2007).
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otherwise “have a ‘voice’ in the decision-making process.”221 When a
court renders a legal decision on the basis of arguments or facts never
presented by the instant parties—in other words, when a court applies
precedent—it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the instant parties insofar
as they feel denied the right to be heard.222
Though again not a perfect remedy, Rule 24(a)(2) allows parties
who will be affected by a given precedent to intervene and defend their
interest. Rule 24 gives these parties the right to be heard where they
otherwise would not be. In addition, to the extent that Rule 24
encourages potentially affected parties to intervene, interests akin to
those of all potential future parties—whether or not they personally
had the opportunity to intervene—are more likely to have been
represented when the precedent was set. Moreover, by increasing the
court’s exposure to different sources and greater volumes of
information, Rule 24 also helps ensure the court’s decision was not
made on the basis of faulty, misrepresentative, or inadequate data. The
greater likelihood that a court’s decision is based on all of the relevant
data, in turn, increases the public’s confidence in the decision’s fairness,
and thus the court’s legitimacy. And the sounder the decision, the less
likely it is to be overruled, which similarly increases the court’s
legitimacy.223
B. The Inadequacy of Alternative Remedies
The argument for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention uninhibited by
Article III standing would be considerably less powerful if existing
procedural remedies adequately accommodated the needs of third
parties and the decisionmaking process. When one considers Rule 24’s
alternatives, however, the case for intervention of right becomes even
clearer.

221. Id. at 664.
222. Against this argument is the standard account of stare decisis as a guardian of a court’s
legitimacy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 866 (“The legitimacy of the Court . . . fade[s] with the
frequency of its vacillation.”). But these arguments—one for representation and the other for
stare decisis—are not mutually exclusive. The best way to accommodate both interests might be
to allow interested parties to intervene in a case so that the resulting precedent better
accommodates the interests of future parties it binds.
223. See id. (arguing that frequent judicial inconsistency is perceived as “evidence that
justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short
term”).
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1. The Amicus Curiae Brief. Rule 24 intervention only operates at
the trial level.224 A party permitted to intervene at the trial level will
continue to be treated as an original party through the course of any
appeal,225 but a party cannot intervene at the appellate level. By
contrast, parties interested in the resolution of an appellate case who
were not part of the original litigation can submit an amicus curiae
brief.226 Because amicus briefs do not require the same degree of
involvement at the trial stage but nevertheless can play a role at the
appellate level—where substantive precedential law is made—a
reasonable case can be made that amicus briefs are a preferable
alternative to intervention from the perspective of a would-be
intervenor. And federal judges would almost certainly prefer to deal
with multiple amici than multiple parties on each side of the litigation.
But the ease of filing an amicus brief is, in part, its undoing. Parties
are not entitled to file amicus briefs at will, but instead may do so only
when the court or both parties consent.227 Getting consent to file an
amicus brief only gets you so far. District and appellate courts rarely
cite amici, and many judges consider them to be an improper addition
to the record.228 Others, such as Judge Posner, view amicus briefs as
inefficient and suspect that they are intended as “an end run around
court-imposed limitations on the length of parties’ briefs.”229
Sometimes it is not clear that judges read amicus briefs at all. For
instance, after his dissent in Frank v. Walker, Judge Posner defended
his seeming reversal of his position from Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board on the grounds that Crawford was written before he

224. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only govern federal district courts. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States district courts . . . .”). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not have an
intervention rule analogous to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
225. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“Had the State sought review . . .
Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to seek review, enabling him
to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally.”).
226. See FED. R. APP. P. 29.
227. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)(2) (“Any other amicus curiae [than those filed by the
government] may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states that all parties have
consented to its filing.”).
228. Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 686, 695 (2008).
229. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003). But see Justice
Breyer Calls for Experts To Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17
(“[Amicus] briefs play an important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical
matters, helping to make us not experts but educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve
the quality of our decisions.”).
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knew the true nature of voter identification laws.230 Specifically, Judge
Posner had not yet realized that, given no actual evidence of voterimpersonation fraud, voter identification laws were “a mere fig leaf for
efforts to disenfranchise voters likely to vote for the political party that
does not control the state government,”231 as he would later put it in
Frank v. Walker. But Judge Posner must not have done his homework:
the Brennan Center for Justice filed an amicus brief in the 2007
Crawford litigation that demonstrated, among other things, that “there
is no evidence of impersonation fraud in Indiana,”232 that “not a single
Indiana resident has ever been indicted for impersonation fraud,”233
and that the study the district court relied on to uphold the voter
identification law itself recognized that “wrongful disenfranchisement
of voters is a ‘far bigger problem’ than voter fraud.”234 A person who
files an amicus brief, it would seem, is a person who runs a substantial
risk of being ignored.
Perhaps the likelihood of being ignored is actually a merit of the
amicus brief. Judges too often rely on dubious amicus facts without
independently confirming their accuracy. For instance, in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co.,235 the Supreme Court had to determine whether
the Constitution was violated when a state judge failed to recuse
himself in a case involving a party who had spent $3 million on the
judge’s reelection campaign.236 Dissenting from the majority, Chief
Justice John Roberts argued that the contribution did not violate due
process, citing an amicus brief for numerous “examples of judicial
elections in which independent expenditures backfired and hurt the
candidate’s campaign.”237 The amicus brief cited a law review article,
which itself had cited an email from a state judge that was “‘on file with’
the authors.”238 Similarly, in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders,239 many of the factual claims referenced in the majority

230. See Posner, supra note 14.
231. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).
232. Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellants at 2, Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2218,
06-2317).
233. Id. at 7–8.
234. Id. at 9.
235. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 566 U.S. 868 (2009)
236. Id. at 872.
237. Id. at 901 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
238. Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1785 (2014).
239. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
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opinion and cited to in an amicus brief were not actually supported by
any authority in the brief.240 Frighteningly, these cases are not rare,
isolated incidents.241
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention shares none of these disadvantages.
First, Rule 24(a)(2) enables intervention of right, which, at least in
theory, is a right a judge cannot discretionarily deny if the intervenor
satisfies Rule 24(a)(2)’s conditions. Second, because the information
presented at trial by intervenors is the record, judges are considerably
more likely to take intervenors’ arguments and data seriously. As an
upshot of being taken seriously, intervenors’ arguments and data are
more likely to be cross-examined by opposing counsel. Consequently,
dubious data, of the sort sometimes found in amicus briefs, are less
likely to enter the judicial decisionmaking calculus. In the status quo,
by contrast, the perception of amicus briefs as unimportant serves as a
disincentive to contest their facts. Even if a lawyer is inclined to contest
opposing counsel’s amicus facts, the sheer volume of amicus briefs at
some levels of litigation makes this task nearly impossible.242
Intervention also offers tactical advantages amicus briefs cannot. For
instance, parties intervening at the trial level have the ability, just like
an original party, to preserve certain issues for appellate review.243
Amicus briefs, on the other hand, can only respond to issues preserved
by the parties on appeal.244 Thus, parties who seek to shape the
contours of a given judicial rule should prefer intervention to
participation as an amicus.
2. Permissive Intervention under Rule 24(b). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b) enables judges to grant intervention permissively
rather than of right. The requirements imposed by Rule 24(b) are
significantly less demanding than those in Rule 24(a)(2). In contrast to
Rule 24(a)(2)’s tripartite requirement, Rule 24(b) asks only whether

240. Larsen, supra note 238, at 1785.
241. See id. at 1757–1800 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on dubious
amicus facts).
242. See id., at 1764 (“The number of amicus briefs filed [in the Supreme Court] and the
amount of seemingly legitimate information available to present makes it very unlikely that a
litigant can adequately respond to amici-presented factual claims.”).
243. This is an upshot of intervenors’ presumptive status as full parties to the litigation. See
supra note 108 and accompanying text. Critically, however, an intervenor cannot actually appeal
unless she has Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (noting that
“status as a ‘party’ does not equate with status as an appellant”).
244. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(“There is no dispute that an amicus curiae may not raise new issues on appeal.”).
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the applicant has a “conditional right to intervene by a federal
statute”245 or “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.”246 Unlike Rule 24(a)(2), however,
Rule 24(b) does not grant a right. Apart from the requirement that the
intervenor share a claim of law or fact, the action under Rule 24(b) is
entirely at the judge’s discretion.247 It is unlikely that a court that
applies Article III standing to Rule 24(a)(2) intervention for prudential
reasons would open suits up to Rule 24(b) intervenors.248
Furthermore, the arguments for applying Article III standing to
Rule 24(a)(2) intervention of right apply equally to permissive Rule
24(b) intervention. A permissive intervenor is just as much “on an
equal footing”249 as a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor, and would similarly
destroy Article III jurisdiction according to the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning.250 Because a Rule 24(b) intervenor presumably has a less
significant interest in the litigation than a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor—
otherwise they would have attempted to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2)251—Rule 24(b) intervenors are also more likely to turn courts
into “judicial versions of college debating forums.”252 Accordingly,
circuits using Article III standing as a prudential barrier would
presumably be less likely to allow intervention under Rule 24(b) than
under Rule 24(a)(2).
3. The Democratic Process. The Supreme Court’s standing cases
make clear that the constitutionally preferred method of redressing

245. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(A).
246. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
247. See 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 261 (“An application for permissive
intervention is addressed to the discretion of the court, whereas an application for intervention of
right seems to pose only a question of law.”).
248. But see Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2015) (allowing an intervenor
without standing under Rule 24(b) because he only sought to unseal legal documents).
249. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
250. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n Article III case or
controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article
III case or controversy.”). But see Flynt, 782 F.3d at 967 (allowing an intervenor who did not have
standing).
251. In reality, Rule 24(b) is used by litigants as a fallback to Rule 24(a)(2). See 7C WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 31, § 1902, at 262 (“Applicants often will rely alternatively on both
subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) and courts sometimes hold that intervention will be allowed
without specifying which branch of the rule is on point.”).
252. Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)).
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generalized grievances is the electoral process.253 This approach makes
sense for the majority of generally applicable legislative rules. But as it
concerns generally applicable judicial rules, democratic redressability
is an implausible remedy. Legislative gridlock precludes many a
statutory amendment at the federal level,254 even if this might not be as
significant a concern at the state level.255 Parties who overcome the
substantial obstacle of gridlock may yet meet an insuperable one:
according to the judicial supremacy principle articulated in Cooper v.
Aaron, federal courts’ interpretation of the Constitution is the
Constitution, and therefore not subject to legislative or executive
second-guessing.256 In many cases, either for political or constitutional
reasons, the political process will not afford an effective remedy to a
party wishing to change precedent.
Considering the alternatives to Rule 24(a)(2)—that is, the amicus
brief, Rule 24(b), and the democratic process—intervention of right is
likely the most plausible way to mitigate the process errors of stare
decisis. Rule 24(a)(2) can only play this role, however, if parties who
seek to use it are not required to demonstrate independent Article III
standing.
CONCLUSION
Stare decisis requires that decisions issued by federal courts be
followed by litigants further down the pike. Whether this is a merit or
fault of our judicial system is an open question. There is certainly value,
for courts and society more generally, in a system of stare decisis that
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles.”257 It is hard to imagine how society could function

253. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) (“[C]itizens dissatisfied with
provisions of [generally applicable laws] need not overlook the availability of the normal
democratic process.”).
254. See SARAH BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN? (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRevTableRev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZGL2-WREZ] (noting, among other things, that the 2011–2012 Congress was
the most gridlocked in the postwar era).
255. See 2016 State & Legislative Partisan Composition (Pre-Election), NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections
/Legis_Control_2016_Nov7.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQM9-WBQM] (showing that the majority of
state governments are not divided).
256. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“No state legislator or executive or judicial
officer can war against [the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution] without violating
his undertaking to support it.”).
257. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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otherwise: the rule of law could hardly take root in an amnesic
judiciary, in which courts would be free to determine legal principles
afresh in some Kafkaesque judicial version of Groundhog Day.258 But
the impulse to “treat[] like cases alike”259 should not lead us to ignore
two other important judicial values: accuracy and fairness. Stare decisis
promotes the values of consistency, efficiency, and fairness it was
designed to advance. At the same time, it has the potential to force
reliance on suboptimal precedent and to deny parties the ability to be
heard to the same extent as those who are first to litigate an issue.
Although hardly a cure-all, Rule 24(a)(2) mitigates stare decisis’s
process issues. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a party whose interest will
potentially be impaired by a given case’s stare decisis effect has the
ability to intervene and so influence the result. Even when a future
party cannot intervene itself, the probability that an intervenor’s
interests will anticipate—and in a sense represent—those of the future
party increases under Rule 24(a)(2). Perhaps more important, Rule
24(a)(2) intervention potentially increases the quality of judicial
decisionmaking by increasing the amount of information and number
of perspectives represented in a given case. Conveniently, Rule
24(a)(2) also provides a court the ability to limit the scope of an
intervenor’s participation, allowing judges to exploit the Rule’s
informative benefits while limiting procedural complication.
Requiring that intervenors satisfy Article III standing robs parties
and the federal judiciary of these potential benefits. It would be one
thing if Article III clearly applied to Rule 24(a)(2). The Constitution
has stood in the way of change before—that, fundamentally, is its
purpose. But the use of Article III standing to bar intervention once a
justiciable case or controversy has been established is an
extraconstitutional use of the doctrine. In any event, it is a cruder-thannecessary tool to address the “floodgates” concern expressed by the
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.
The Brennan Center did not move to intervene in Crawford, and
it is far from clear that its intervention would have changed the
outcome of the case. But regardless of one’s views on the merits of
voter identification laws, surely we would all prefer a judicial system in
which some of our most esteemed federal judges did not regret—and
blame on inadequate information—their most significant decisions.

258. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1993).
259. Hart, supra note 133, at 264.

